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Abstract. Current approaches to information security focused 
on deploying security mechanisms, creating policies and 
communicating those to employees.   Little consideration was 
given to how policies and mechanisms affect trust relationships in 
an organization, and in turn security behavior.  Our analysis of 
208 in-depth interviews with employees in two large multinational 
organizations found two trust relationships: between the 
organization and its employees (organization-employee trust), and 
between employees (inter-employee trust).  When security 
interferes with employees’ ability to complete work tasks, they rely 
on inter-employee trust to overcome those obstacles (e.g. sharing 
a password with a colleague who is locked out of a system and 
urgently needs access).  Thus, non-compliance is a collaborative 
action, which develops inter-employee trust further, as employees 
now become “partners in crime”.  The existence of these two 
relationships also presents employees with a clear dilemma: either 
try to comply with cumbersome security (and honor organization-
employee trust) or help their colleagues by violating security 
(preserving inter-employee trust).  We conclude that designers of 
security policies and mechanisms need to support both types of 
trust, and discuss how to leverage trust to achieve effective security 
protection.  This can enhance organizational cooperation to tackle 
security challenges, provide motivation for employees to behave 
securely, while also reducing the need for expensive physical and 
technical security mechanisms.   
Keywords — Trust; Information security management; 
Compliance; Security design 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, information security seeks to mitigate 
security risks by implementing policies and technical 
mechanisms that specify employee behavior; policies also may 
threaten sanctions in case of non-compliance.  The impact of 
this “comply-or-die” approach on day-to-day functioning of an 
organization is significant: organizations not only pay a cost for 
security mechanism operations, but also create constraints for 
honest employees seeking to perform well [1].  It slows down 
their production tasks, sometimes even completely blocking 
them, mostly due to security mechanisms and processes not 
being designed around employee needs and priorities [2-5].  
This type of security fails to deliver effective protection even 
though it drains productivity.  Recent industry data suggests 
that security breaches increase year on year (48% increase in 
the past year [6]), with a large part of those attributed to 
employee behavior [7].   
The effects and potential benefits of trust on employee 
security behavior has not been explored.  We already know that 
employees are emotionally attached to the organizations they 
work for [8][9]; they are also motivated and capable to protect 
them [4][10][11].  Despite this, in current security approaches, 
they are often treated as untrustworthy.  Excessive monitoring 
and restrictions are put in place, “just in case employees turn 
bad in the future” [12].  But strict policies that cannot be 
followed means employees create ad-hoc security deployments 
that spin out of organizational control [10].  Also, by increasing 
restrictions, the organization and its security managers cannot 
reap the second-order benefits of trust, such as enhanced 
cooperation, goodwill development, and creativity to address 
organizational security challenges [13].  We argue that 
organizations’ productivity and security can be improved by 
shifting thinking towards incentivizing trustworthy behavior, 
rather than restricting and controlling employee actions.   
In this paper we present insights  about security-related trust 
development in organizations.  We analyze a set of interviews 
on employee security behavior, and we compare our findings to 
a framework of trust development [15].  We identify two 
different trust relationships emerging in organizational 
environments and present the effect of those on security 
behaviors.  We then present the emerging conflicts between 
keeping the organization secure and preserving established trust 
relationships in the organizational environment.  Finally we 
discuss how the resulting improved understanding on the role 
of trust in security behaviors can be used to provide effective 
information security management and contribute to the design 
and deployment of effective information security solutions.   
II. TREATING USERS AS A PROBLEM: THE QUEST TO 
ELIMINATE “HUMAN RISK” 
Information security breaches originating from human 
behavior lead people being described as the “weakest link” in 
the security chain [16].  The main human-related threats to 
security can be attributed to three areas: (1) human error leading 
to data leakages or creating vulnerabilities that can be exploited 
by attackers [17], (2) social engineering, where attackers 
psychologically manipulate people into performing security-
compromising actions or divulging information [18] and (3) 
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insider attacks, when employees intentionally exceed or misuse 
authorized levels of access to networks, systems, or data to steal 
confidential or proprietary information from the organization 
[19].  To counter these threats, organizations implement various 
assurance mechanisms (e.g. access control restrictions, anti-
virus software, data loss prevention systems), combined with 
policy formulation and communication, aiming to render 
employees aware and able to behave in a secure way.  When 
control is impossible (e.g. employee handling of confidential 
documents), monitoring and sanctions are introduced to deter 
misbehavior.  Employees violating policies are threatened with 
potential reprimands that can be as serious as losing their job 
and legal action taken against them.     
In theory, implementing extensive security controls and 
sanctions should prevent both intentional insider breaches and 
reduce the impact of erroneous behaviors that increase 
organizational security exposure.  In practice, however it has 
been shown to have number of drawbacks: 
 Human-related security risks are not well-defined. 
Exhaustively covering a wide range of behavioral 
scenarios requires implementation of architectural 
means to identify and eliminate of all potential 
vulnerabilities an organization may face is expensive 
and practically impossible.  In a time when security 
budgets becoming tight [6], this can lead to 
organizations having to compromise with suboptimal 
solutions [1][14].    
 Strict controls take away employee flexibility to 
respond to changing environments, reducing their 
ability to respond to non-predictable situations [20].  
When employees engage with tasks where flexibility is 
required (e.g. remote or home working) control 
becomes time-wasting, inefficient or even impossible 
to implement.  As a result, in order to maintain this 
flexibility, organizations end up relaxing security 
policies, weakening the system [21]. 
 Excessive assurance and sanctions can lead to 
employee dissatisfaction creating a value gap between 
the organization and its employees [22].  This hinders 
the development of social capital and shared values 
[23], leading to minimal incentive for secure behavior, 
and increased probability of insider attacks [19].  It also 
impacts the ability of the organization to retain its 
valuable employees; dissatisfaction can lead to them 
eventually leaving the organization [24].    
All the aforementioned problems suggest that attempts to 
eliminate human-related security risks through assurance and 
sanctions essentially weaken organizational defenses.  Security 
design needs to stop treating employees as intrinsically 
untrustworthy.  Recent research has shown that most employees 
want to participate in security, and even create their own 
security solutions when the existing ones do not work [10] (e.g. 
sharing passwords to aid colleagues in urgent need for system 
access, changing those afterwards to reduce potential security 
risks).  Building on this employee “propensity to do good”, in 
the remainder of this paper, we make a case for trust as an 
important element of security design. We start by identifying 
two security-related trust relationships in organizations, 
presenting their impact on employee security behavior, how 
conflicts between the two relationships arise, leading to 
insecure behaviors, and how these conflicts can be addressed to 
create more effective security implementations. 
III. A FRAMEWORK FOR TRUST 
Mayer at al. [25] define trust as “willingness to be 
vulnerable based on positive expectations about the actions of 
others”.  It is only required in transactions where risk and 
uncertainty about the outcome exist, leaving a trustor (trusting 
actor) vulnerable to the trustee’s (trusted actor) actions.  Risk 
usually arises from the potential losses a trustor stands to suffers 
if the trustee does not behave as expected.  Uncertainty arises 
from the lack of information available to the trustor about the 
ability and motivation of the trustee to fulfil in the transaction 
[15].  Despite the risk and uncertainty, a trustor makes 
themselves vulnerable to the trustee due to potential benefits by 
the trustee’s later fulfilment.  On a single transaction basis a 
trustee would be better off defecting after receiving the benefits 
of the trusting action: they have already received all the 
potential rewards from the transaction, so they are at a point of 
maximum gain, having invested minimal effort.  Any effort to 
fulfil their part requires investment of additional resources that 
will reduce their net benefit compared to the pre-fulfilment state 
(Fig. 1, [26]).  
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑒′𝑠 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 = 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠 −
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  
Fig. 1. Trustee benefit equation [26] 
A. Trust-warranting properties 
Fulfilment motivation for the trustee comes from the 
existence of trust-warranting properties [27], the long-term 
effects of which outweigh immediate non-fulfilment gains. 
Trust-warranting properties can be distinguished between 
intrinsic and contextual (Fig. 1).   
1) Intrinsic properties:  These are relatively stable 
attributes of the trustee that affect their ability and motivation 
for fulfilment in the trust transaction. 
 Ability: Trustee’s possession of the resources required 
for fulfilment (e.g. knowledge required on performing 
required security actions) 
 Motivation: Fulfilment incentivised by factors internal 
to the trustee (e.g. personal costs of breaking trust).  It 
is driven by internalized norms or benevolence that 
dictate doing what a trustee perceives to be “the right 
thing” and provide non-monetary fulfilment rewards to 
the trustee, like personal satisfaction.      
2) Contextual properties:  These constitute attributes of the 
context of the interaction (temporal, social and institutional) 
that provide motivation for trustworthy behavior by dis-
incentivising non-fulfilment, leading to self-interested trustees 
fulfilling: 
 Temporal embeddedness: The prospect of future 
interactions becomes an incentive for fulfilment [28]:  
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Non-fulfilment can damage future trust shown towards 
the trustee. 
 Social embeddedness:  When performance information 
about a trustee’s past behavior can be shared amongst 
trustors, potential reputational damage due to 
fulfilment failure in a transaction can act as a fulfilment 
incentive [29]. 
 Institutional embeddedness: The presence of external 
enforcement third parties penalizing non-compliance 
also acts as a non-compliant deterrent for the trustee 
[30]. 
 
Fig. 2. Model of a trust interaction (adapted from Riegelberger at al. [15]) 
The important difference between intrinsic and contextual 
properties is to whom the trustor’s trust is placed.  Intrinsic 
properties result in party trust (i.e. to the trustee), while 
contextual lead to control trust: to the mechanisms that dis-
incentivize non-fulfilment by the trustee [31].  Fulfilment due 
to control trust does not imply a trustee is trustworthy, but in 
most cases it is “good enough” – as it still leads to successful 
transactions [15]. 
IV. TRUST AND ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY  
Security (and the systems that come with it) is part of a 
wider socio-technical environment, where the primary goal is 
effective and efficient completion of production tasks [32][33].  
Trust is a key element of that environment: it aids the 
development of social norms amongst employees, leading to 
improved collaboration and more effective production task 
completion [25].  Current uses of the term trust in security have 
a very narrow meaning though.  Trusted components have been 
defined as “systems or components whose failure can break the 
security policy” [18].  But this definition refers to system 
components (hardware or software), certified to exhibit a 
specific behavior under specific conditions; this is assurance 
not trust.  For trust to exist the organization should have no or 
little control over what employees can do, and, instead of 
stringent enforcement, choosing only to trust and encourage 
them to behave in a secure manner [21].  Based on the definition 
of trust as risk and uncertainty, the only component whose 
failure can break the security policy is the people who use those 
systems, as total control over them is impossible.   
An attempt to move away from the restrictive understanding 
of the role of trust in security management was made by 
Flechais et al [21].  They used Riegelsberger et al.’s model [15] 
to discuss current trust placement in security implementations 
and identified a number of ways in which trust-warranting 
properties affect employee security behavior. Their first 
suggestion was that an organization should not aim to achieve 
total assurance if employees exhibit the intrinsic properties 
required to behave trustworthy.  Well-trained employees 
(ability) that understand the risk mitigation effects of 
trustworthy behavior (motivation) are more likely to act in ways 
that protect the organization.  On the other hand, intrinsic 
properties can also lead to trust violations: benevolence, social 
norms and expectation of future relationships can break the 
security policy.  An employee’s willingness to help a colleague 
locked out of a system by sharing their password may be 
stronger than their motivation to adhere to the security policy.  
This evolves over time, after a number of successful trust 
exchanges, and can be dangerous for the organization.  Social 
engineering attackers, for example, can exploit this by 
pretending to be benevolent (e.g. selflessly helping to fix a 
problem on the target's PC which they created in the first place) 
[21].   
Social embeddedness can also have a very powerful effect 
on security behavior: Weirich and Sasse [32] report that 
newcomers’ security behavior follows that of members of their 
immediate work team, even after security training as part of 
their induction, as desire to “fit in” is usually stronger.   
Temporal embeddedness, on the other hand, is used by the 
organization to reduce risks from employee behavior.  
Employees ready to leave a company, for example, may be 
willing to vandalize and cause damage to systems they have 
access to, since they have no expectation of future benefit from 
their employer and their colleagues. If they are leaving to join 
a competitor, they may even have reasons to break trust (e.g. 
stealing sensitive intellectual property information).  
Organizational “exit protocols” aim to eliminate this risk, 
making sure that people who are leaving the organization 
cannot exploit trust that was extended to them as employees.   
Institutional embeddedness also acts as a non-compliance 
deterrent. The presence of organizations or institutions with 
power to sanction untrustworthy behavior (e.g. ethics 
committees or legislation) acts as a deterrent, usually depending 
on the type, strictness and severity of punishment (e.g. the 
threat of being excluded from a professional group). 
Based on the aforementioned analysis, Flechais et al. [21] 
made a number of suggestions for improving security: 
1) Simplify security: When a degree of flexibility is 
required, rigid policies cannot work because they are too 
complex, constraining or expensive, eventually exhausting 
employees’ security compliance budget [3].  The only available 
option is to encourage and trust employees to behave in a secure 
manner, complementing this with monitoring to detect whether 
employees are actually complying with the policy. 
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2) Improve education: Security awareness and training 
should be given continuously to all employees, as opposed to 
just giving it to newcomers to improve motivation and ability. 
3) Promote security culture: Ensure security policy is 
neither excessive nor unfair. 
4) Participative security: Involve various stakeholders to 
increase perceived responsibility. 
5) Foster group cohesion: Group people into security 
groups to improve social responsibility to contribute to security. 
Despite their potential usefulness, the above suggestions are 
mostly empirical, based on “common knowledge” discussed in 
the context of Riegelsberger et al.’s framework, but not based 
on any data.  As a result, the authors conclude that further 
research is required to examine the impact of trust on security 
behaviors and its effect on security implementations.  This 
suggestion acted as a motivator for the research presented in the 
remainder of this paper. 
V. STUDY DESCRIPTION 
To understand the trust relationships developed through the 
interaction of employees with security systems, we conducted 
a secondary analysis on a set of interviews with employees of 
two large multinational organizations.  We had 120 interview 
transcripts available form the first organization and 88 from the 
second one.  The interviews were semi-structured and 
conducted on a one-to-one basis by a team of seven researchers 
(including both the authors). Each lasted approximately 50 
minutes, allowing for elicitation of a suitably rich 
representation of the employee experience of security.  
Participants were recruited via the company email newsletter, 
sent to all employees. They held various lower-level and lower 
to middle management positions within a number of 
organizational divisions, including customer service, 
marketing, administration, finance, procurement and IT.  
Participation was anonymous and participants were given an 
informed consent form, assuring that they would not be 
identified or followed up.  After the interview, participants were 
paid the equivalent of $40.  We did not encourage participants 
to tell us about security infractions, but simply asked about their 
awareness of, and experience with, a set of corporate security 
policies.  The structure of interviews touched upon aspects of 
security awareness and compliance, including: 
a. What is the employee perception of how security 
impacts their role?   
b. What do employees appreciate in terms of 
organizational support for security?   
c. Where employees exercise non-compliance as a 
response to shortcomings or frictions in the 
organizational security experience, what conditions led 
to those behaviors divergent from organization policy?  
Interviews were recorded, transcribed, and a Grounded 
Theory analysis [34] was conducted, using Atlas Ti.  The two 
authors independently coded an initial set of ten interviews and 
a codebook was devised.  This was then used for the full 
analysis of all the interviews by one of the authors, aiming to 
capture the different roles trust plays in the deployment of 
organizational security.  The results of this analysis are 
presented in the next section (primary analysis of the interview 
data for one of the two organizations was published in [10]).  It 
is also important to note here that employee responses and the 
corresponding emerging behavioral patterns, presented in the 
next section, were consistent and of similar nature in both the 
organizations we studied. 
VI. UNDERSTANDING ORGANIZATIONAL TRUST 
RELATIONSHIPS 
From our analysis we identified the presence of two 
different security-related trust relationships that affect the 
design, implementation and evolution of security behaviors in 
an organization: (1) organization-employee trust: 
organization’s dependency on employees behaving securely 
and (2) inter-employee trust: employee dependency on each 
other that affects their security behavior.  
A. Organization-employee trust 
Employees reported that, based on the existing security 
implementation, the organization’s security appears to 
significantly depend on them behaving in a trustworthy way:   
P143: “We tend culturally to be allowed more freedom and 
responsibility than some people might do.” 
P200: (talking about security implementers) “so long as we 
tell them that we’re going to do something, they’ll trust us to do 
it, they won’t necessarily come along and sort of sit behind you 
and make sure you’re actually implementing that piece of 
design.” 
They also recognized organizational vulnerability to 
potential misbehaviors of its employees: 
P143: “It’s almost impossible in security terms to stop a 
human actually attaching a document when they shouldn’t it’s 
very difficult to get round that.” 
Based on the above, we define organization-employee trust 
as: “The level of organizational dependency on the actions of 
employees that the existing security implementation creates”.  
This type of trust was present in situations when the 
organization trusted its employees to behave in a trustworthy 
way, thus not restricting their actions, essentially remaining 
vulnerable to their potential misbehaviors.  The development of 
employee-organization trust is based on both intrinsic and 
contextual properties (Fig. 3): 
1) Intrinsic: Employees possess the knowledge and risk 
awareness required to take actions to protect the organization 
(ability) (e.g. P137: “we are using a lot data and we know the 
impact that has on the company and the customers if that gets 
into the wider domain”) but also show a propensity to do good 
(motivation): P178: “So maybe I’m not the right person to take 
those risks and make those choices, but I think we all have to 
share that that’s part of the ethos of the company.” 
2) Contextual: Employees need to comply with 
organizational policies to avoid any sanctions (temporal 
incentives). P4: “…They do it only because “Oh, I might get 
into trouble if I don’t do it”.  
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Fig. 3. Organisation – employee trust development incentives 
Despite the existence of both intrinsic (ability, motivation) 
and temporal incentives to comply with security, employees 
reported a number of security violations driven by the current 
configuration of organizational systems not allowing efficient 
production-related task completion.  For example: 
P2: “…they’ll take their company computer off the proxy, 
and while you’re off the proxy, go home, log in, grab the files, 
save them, come back in, you’re back on the proxy, you’re 
okay.” 
In general employees appeared to recognize the reliance of 
the organization’s security implementation on their behavior.  
In addition they were motivated to behave in a secure way, 
based on both intrinsic and contextual incentives that appeared 
to be driving this behavior.  Despite that, we identified a wide 
range of security violations by employees, routed back to three 
main reasons: (1) problematic security implementation, (2) 
inaccurate user risk perception and awareness, and (3) the need 
to develop or preserve existing inter-employee trust 
relationships prevailing over the need to act in a way that 
preserved employee-organization trust.  In the next section we 
focus on how the third factor (preserving inter-employee trust) 
leads to security violations (for more examples of a wider range 
of violations relating to (1) and (2) please refer to [10]). 
B. Inter-employee trust as a non-compliance motivator  
We identified many cases where employees either explicitly 
reported the presence of trust as a driver for non-compliance, or 
discussed how the close relationship they have with their 
colleagues lead to them not following the prescribed security 
practices.    
P123: “You work with them so much.  God, the engineers 
that I work with for our company I spent hours with them on a 
daily basis, so you do get to know them very well.”  
I: “So if someone asked you to share your password with 
them, you’d have no problem with that?” P126: “No, as long as 
it’s a trusted colleague.” 
Existence of trust amongst employees acts as an enabler to 
productivity: 
P57: “I mean SharePoint is good, but you have to be trusting 
for users to use it properly.” 
Based on this, we define inter-employee trust as: “The 
willingness of employees to act in a way that renders themselves 
or the organization vulnerable to the actions of another 
member of the organization”.  It can be developed both inside 
and outside the security domain, and leads to behaviors that 
diverge from the security policy.  A few examples: 
P2 (on password sharing): I have some level of trust with 
them, it’s more if they have enough level of trust with me to be 
“Okay, here’s the thing so you can log in and do it quick.  I’ll 
change it as soon as I come back so that we’re secure and all 
that but I need you to keep working to get the job done.” 
P149 (on sharing documents through non-official 
communication channels): “Well if someone’s into the 
company and they need a certain document they know where to 
find it then pass it on.” 
P120 (on not locking their screens): “…because when you 
comment on it and say “Well you should actually be locking 
your screen when you walk away”, the comment you get back 
is the fact that “Well you know we should be able to trust people 
around.” 
As the interview extracts show, employees appear willing 
to knowingly diverge from recommended practices: they 
disclose information or perform actions for which they could be 
held accountable, either because they need to help a colleague 
in need (e.g. share a password or information) or due to trusting 
people around them (e.g. leaving their laptops unlocked or 
letting them tailgate).  Essentially, when security creates 
problems, employees turn to their trusted colleagues.  They use 
a resource readily available (inter-employee trust) to cope with 
over-restrictive mechanisms that hinder both their individual 
ability to do their job but also improve ability to collaborate 
with their colleagues.  An employee who was locked out of a 
system by entering their infrequently used password incorrectly 
and who cannot access the helpdesk immediately can easily 
borrow a trusted colleague’s password to fetch some 
information they need urgently.  Willingness to help a 
colleague, recognition that they may end up in the same 
situation in the future and the overall desire to be part of the 
overall organizational social environment provide enough 
incentives for a colleague to help them, even if that means 
breaking the security policy. 
Similarly to organization-employee trust, the development 
of inter-employee trust is also based on both intrinsic and 
contextual properties (Fig. 4): 
1) Contextual:  Successful employee collaboration results 
in increased willingness to collaborate in the future (temporal 
embeddedness) P123: “I spent hours with them on a daily basis, 
so you do get to know them very well.”, but also in increased 
feeling that collaborators are members of the same social group 
(social embeddedness) P191: “Yeah if it’s someone within the 
team then they can be trusted, yeah. I wouldn’t do it for anyone 
external to the company”.   
2) Intrinsic: Employees feel the need to help someone in 
need within their social environment (P31: “…there’s a policy 
that, shortly after we moved to this building they made a big 
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deal out of “Don’t allow following access through doorways.” 
[…] it seems kind of impolite to say, Sorry, I can't let you 
through, I’m going to have to slam the door in your face. 
Human nature tends to be I’ll hold the door for you.”.   They 
even perceived their colleagues as collaborators that 
collectively preserve organization-employee trust, affirming 
their ability to protect the organization (P80: “So when you’re 
an employee and I speak to another employee, it’s not a 
problem, because everybody knows what the security policies 
are with the company”).   
 
Fig. 4. Inter–employee trust development incentives 
C. Conflicts of two trust relationships 
Our findings suggest that employees appear sufficiently 
able and motivated to behave securely, but sometimes their 
relationship with their colleagues prevails over the need for 
security.  Many of the non-compliance scenarios we identified 
were related to security policies essentially asking employees 
to distrust their colleagues (e.g. no password sharing, lock 
screen, no tailgating).  Employees then need to prioritize on 
which of the two trust relationships they need to preserve, 
ending up breaking organization-employee trust to help 
improve or preserve inter-employee trust.  This leads to the 
emergence of two different types of organizational security: one 
defined in the policy and one devised by employees on an ad-
hoc basis, based on their interaction with information security 
mechanisms and perceived risks (Shadow Security, [10]).  
When this happens, security inevitably spins out of 
organizational control, leaving the organization vulnerable to 
behaviors out of sight of security managers.  We identified a 
few cases of this behavior.  For example the self-devised 
security mechanism of this employee when working with 
contractors that needed wider access than what they already 
had: 
P12: “…as far as “Oh, this contractor wants to get 
something done quick, here use my ID for doing that. You know, 
and then I’ll switch the password after.  Okay, he’s sort of 
protected it, but really is, you’ve just shared your ID, you just 
shared a password, and with a non-company person, you know, 
violation, but you need to get your work done.” 
Another example highlighting the presence of a trust 
conflict is contractor access and interaction with permanent 
employees.  Contractor motivation for trustworthy behavior can 
sometimes be lower: 
P70: “…before when we had like our group meetings, even 
though we were contractors, we were also allowed in those 
meetings, but as an employee, I felt myself to be more a part of 
that group now, because now we belong to the company” 
Despite the potential of this resulting to insecure behaviors and 
organization-employee trust violations, contractors are treated 
by employees like everyone else:  
P9: “…when that contractor was still there I wasn’t told to 
treat contractors differently.” 
In addition, employees talked about colleagues leaving and 
rejoining as contractors – should they now treat them 
differently?  
P41: “I saw this co-worker who was being hired as a 
contractor and I called the woman […] and she calls me back 
in a couple of days from now and she says “I checked it out and 
found out that that wasn’t really another person, that was 
me…” 
Expecting employees to treat a colleague differently in such a 
case would be unrealistic.  The existing trust relationships 
amongst them are inevitably going to prevail, despite awareness 
that this may increase organizational exposure to security risks. 
 Flechais et al. correctly predicted another problem of inter-
employee trust development: over long periods of time, trust 
turns to reliance, with employee work processes depending on 
collective trust violations (e.g. P90: “…a lot of times the field 
guys, they won’t tend to trust you initially you’ve got to be there 
for a while.  Like now that I’ve been here three years, “Oh, I’ve 
worked with him a lot.  Not a problem, I like working with 
him.””).      
D. The need for assurance  
Our analysis also confirmed another suggestion by Flechais 
et al. [21]: despite violating security to help their colleagues, 
employees appear to appreciate the need for the organization to 
put some controls and limitations in place.   For example: 
P102: “…I think there’s a balance to be struck between 
giving people trust and appreciating their common sense and 
their intelligence and also protecting one’s system from the 
occasional stranger who walks through the area.” 
Employees also appeared to recognize the consequences of 
breaking organization-employee trust: 
P193: “The trust has always been there, but the 
consequences are also there if it’s broken.” 
In summary, employees appear sufficiently motivated and 
able to behave in a trustworthy way, honoring the trust shown 
to them by the organization.  They even recognize the need for 
security mechanisms that limit their actions in order to protect 
the organization and the existence of consequences for trust 
violations.  But when security becomes over-restrictive, 
impacting their ability to proceed with their day-to-day tasks or 
help their colleagues, they are willing to break this trust 
relationship to help develop, improve or maintain inter-
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employee trust that appears to be important and widely 
prevalent amongst them.   
VII. LEVERAGING TRUST RELATIONSHIPS TO IMPROVE 
SECURITY IMPLEMENTATIONS 
Trust-driven security violations create significant risks for 
the organization.  Dependency on collaborative non-
compliance accentuates the perceived need to preserve inter-
employee relationships, leading to security violations becoming 
a norm negatively impacting the development of long-term 
information security culture [35].  It also leads to the 
development of social capital [30] amongst employees 
grounded on collective security violations increasing 
organizational exposure to social engineering: employees 
willing to violate security to help their colleagues can be more 
vulnerable to attacks by impostors that rely on their willingness 
to share information through informal channels.   
Security designers need to understand that - in a highly 
social environment like a large organization - inter-employee 
trust is often more important to employees than complying with 
security.  This should not be used as a pretext to treat employees 
as untrustworthy though: employees possess both the ability 
and motivation to exhibit trustworthy behavior as long as their 
ability to complete their primary tasks is not significantly 
hindered by security.  Organizational security design should 
recognize the existence of the trust relationships identified in 
this paper and their importance for the success of any security 
implementation.  In the remainder of this section, based on our 
improved understanding, we discuss what organizational 
security designers could do in order to accommodate for 
organizational security trust relationships in security design. 
A. Know when to trust and when assurance is necessary 
Despite our findings suggesting that current security 
implementations heavily rely on employees behaving in a 
trustworthy way, this has not been formalized by organizations 
and it is not reflected in current information security 
management strategies.  Organizational insistence on using 
technical mechanisms and sanctions to deter untrustworthy 
behavior has a number of negative effects: 
1. It damages employee ability and motivation to comply 
with security: the perceived lack of organization-
employee trust, materialized through unrealistic 
security expectations, decreases employee ability to 
comply with security policies.  It also creates 
resentment, increasing employee incentive for 
collaborative non-compliance, based on inter-
employee trust.  Prolonged resentment is dangerous 
[36]: it increases the risk for insider attacks and loss of 
valuable human capital, with disgruntled employees 
leaving the organization.   
2. Collaborative non-compliance also encourages 
disregard for security in general and non-compliance 
becoming the habitual behavior amongst employees.  
The emerging security behaviors, may not manage 
risks effectively, due to inaccurate employee 
understanding of security risks and countermeasures, 
but are the best available actions employees can use to 
proceed with production tasks.  Low appreciation for 
the need for security can create a non-compliant 
security culture within the organization [37], also 
resulting in the organization losing track of employee 
actions, thus increasing the security risks it is exposed 
to.   
3. Once a security culture is developed based on 
collaborative security violations, new employees that 
try to “fit in” and participate in inter-employee trust 
development are more likely to follow suit to their 
colleague’s non-compliance. 
To reduce the impact of the aforementioned problems, 
information security should take advantage of both users and 
technology to achieve effective protection.  To achieve this, 
organizations need to know “when to trust” and “when to 
assure”, supporting correct trust development through:  
1) Simplification of security mechanisms: Security design 
should be designing around security hygiene [23]; rules should 
not be broken for productivity reasons.  Security mechanisms 
need to be designed around employee production tasks to 
reduce the need for trust violations for the sake of productivity, 
but also reflecting the trustworthiness an organization should 
show towards its employees.  To eliminate the need for 
password sharing for example, the organization should create 
mechanisms that provide quick account creation for employees 
that need to access to new systems. 
2) Include trust in security communication: When security 
mechanisms are implemented in a way that encourages 
trustworthy behavior, Security Awareness, Education and 
Training campaigns (SAET) should be used to create new 
behaviors better connected and adjusted to the actual risks the 
organization faces not employee-perceived ones [38].  For 
example, in one of the two organizations we examined, home 
working is quite prevalent, with many people being either full 
time home workers or working from home two or three times a 
week.  This makes it impossible for the organization to restrict 
employee actions, so they need to be trusted not to violate 
security.  This organizational dependency on employee 
behavior should be communicated to them to explain their 
importance and responsibility in keeping the organization 
secure.  Communication should: (1) Make it clear to employees 
that they are trusted and supported in their security decisions 
(to improve motivation), also explaining the “It’s business, not 
personal” need for security vigilance and (2) Include 
information on current threats and how real-world trust 
development signals break down when using computer systems 
(improving ability).   
3) Knowing when to assure: Once usable mechanisms and 
effective security communication are in place, clever controls 
are required to balance trust and assurance.  Risk-aware 
employees that interact with well-designed security 
mechanisms, no longer have reasons to violate security, unless 
they are doing so for malicious purposes (e.g. when the rewards 
from not playing by the rules are significantly higher than the 
consequences of not doing so).  In such cases, violations can be 
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detected by improving current monitoring implementations to 
include contextual information on users to detect employee 
trust abuse and precursors of insider attacks.  An employee that 
has full, uninterrupted access to corporate fileservers, should 
not be downloading vast amounts of information locally on 
their computer.  This action on its own may not constitute an 
offence, but it provides sufficient grounds for further 
investigation.  Malicious actions should then be followed up 
with serious consequences that are visibly enforced.  Visible 
enforcement can act both as a deterrence for future misbehavior 
and as a motivation improver, reminding to employees that they 
are trusted and responsible to keep the organization safe. It also 
has to be clear to employees that it is not themselves who are 
deemed as untrustworthy, but assurance is in place to protect 
the organization.   
B. Once developed - don’t enforce it! 
The first assessment of an employee’s trustworthiness 
comes even before they join the organization through 
background checks and vetting procedures during recruitment.  
These process uses past behavior as an indicator of potential 
future actions. The need for this confirms our suggestions that 
total assurance is impossible and ineffective; otherwise 
screening would be unnecessary.  When the organization 
establishes that ability and motivation to behave in a 
trustworthy way are present, there’s no need to over-assure.  
Employees that pass the screening process should be considered 
trustworthy and treated as such instead of being subject to 
continuous restrictions.  The consequent visible presence of 
trust towards employees can inject trust in the organization-
employee psychological contracts that dictate organizational 
employee behavior, leading to cooperation that benefits 
everyone in the organization:  
 People in an organization develop shared values and a 
shared-sense of responsibility for the well-being of the 
organization based on shared formal or informal norms 
promoting cooperation [39][40], which also affect their 
security behavior [37]. Secure behavior should be 
driven by a feeling of contribution to common 
organizational interests, rather than rule-driven actions 
to avoid sanctions. 
 The need for enforcement of problematic security will 
be reduced.  This will then reduce the ‘noise’ 
introduced by productivity-driven ‘legitimate’ 
violations.  The resources saved from reduced noise can 
be reinvested in implementing other more effective 
security mechanisms, enabling the implementation of 
clever monitoring to identify serious malicious activity 
(insider or outsider attacks) [41]. Precursors of serious 
attacks (e.g. intellectual property theft, currently 
accounting for less than one per cent of all cybercrimes, 
also resulting in more than 50% of the monetary losses 
[42]) may be currently lost in false-positive alarms 
when employees violate security for productivity or 
collaboration reasons.    
 Flexibility strengthens employee ability to defend the 
organization.  Attackers are likely to adapt to new 
technologies, but attacks are much harder to succeed 
with suspicious employees, motivated to protect the 
organization and a culture that favors secure behavior 
This is not uncommon in other security 
implementations: for example biometrics at passport 
control are considered to be more effective than 
individuals but when a problem is identified a human 
can take over and use a much richer and broader set of 
factors from the context of the environment to assess a 
passenger’s trustworthiness [21].   
Potential for increased organizational reliance on employee 
security creates another problem though: regulation and 
international standards currently advocate against it.  
Suggestions and regulatory standards to organizations include 
security practices that have proven to be insecure (e.g. 
ISO27002 security standard advocates for frequent password 
changes to improve security [43], despite sufficient evidence 
for the contrary [5]).  Both researchers and practitioners need to 
push for changes in regulation and standards to be up to date 
with latest security research findings and the needs of modern 
organizations.  No organizational resources or user effort 
should be expended on implementing solutions that offer no 
security benefits. 
C. Accommodate urgency, encourage self reporting and follow 
it up  
Organizations also need to create mechanisms for unusual 
circumstances. Non-fulfilment cannot be totally eliminated, as 
this is both uneconomical and prohibitive for productivity, but 
enhancement of the employee-organization trust relationship 
can ensure that it happens less often and does not go unreported.  
Organizations who acknowledge the fact that employees may, 
under rare and unusual conditions, have to circumvent security 
for productivity reasons, should also implement mechanisms 
where employees can report those non-compliance instances. 
Clear instructions should then exist how to deal with any 
potential vulnerabilities.  For example, an employee who shared 
their password with a colleague in an emergency situation 
should recognize this as a violation, then login to a non-
compliance log system and report the behavior.  The same 
could apply to physical access control: an employee who forgot 
their pass should be easily able to get a daily pass through a 
simple verification process.  In both cases, the organization 
should encourage self-reporting by communicating that no 
action will be taken against employees who self-report, while 
those who do not should be susceptible to sanctions.  The 
organization should also ensure adequate measures were taken 
to close the resulting loophole (e.g. employee changed their 
password within two hours).  Accommodating for urgency 
should not be implemented as a substitute to usable systems 
though.  Violations, even reported ones, need to be infrequent 
enough to avoid non-compliance becoming part of employee 
security culture, also avoiding introducing significant 
overheads in terms of resources required to close the loopholes 
created by frequent circumventions. 
D. Promote collective and participative security  
The improved understanding of the role of trust that 
emerges from our findings, together with a participatory 
approach to security design, can enable more effective design 
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of security mechanisms.   Inclusion of users in security design 
can increase their motivation to comply [21][44].   It is 
definitely possible to get help with tailoring security by smaller 
organizational sub-divisions, taking advantage of the already 
existing inter-employee trust.  Line managers, who have a 
considerable influence on their staff’s security decisions can 
also elicit feedback from them on security challenges [10].  
Bringing security to the table at group meetings can lead to 
increased awareness amongst employees and ability to connect 
with the risks presented by their managers or colleagues.  The 
emergent participatory security environment can increase their 
sense of contribution and ownership of security 
implementation, triggering internalized norms and 
benevolence-related compliance.   
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Effective security needs to strike a productive balance 
between trust and assurance.  Our findings suggest that 
employees possess both the ability and motivation to behave 
securely, honoring the trust shown towards them by the 
organization (organization-employee trust), also aided by 
contextual motives to do so.  But when security comes to 
conflict with other parts of their work and relationships with 
their colleagues, non-compliance becomes their only option to 
preserve the existing trust relationships in the social 
environment of the organization (inter-employee trust).  To 
reduce this conflict security management needs to take 
advantage of trust and aid in its development, refraining from 
overly assuring once trust is developed.  Employees that have 
been screened, trained and understand the risks of insecure 
behavior should not need to choose between organization-
employee trust or inter-employee trust when interacting with 
security mechanisms: both trust relationships contribute to the 
organization achieving its productivity targets while remaining 
secure.  Security design that accommodates for this can lead to 
the creation of a high-trust/low-assurance environment which 
can introduce significant economic benefits for organizations: 
compliance coming from employees motivated to behave 
securely, not forced to do so, reduces the need for expensive 
physical and technical mechanisms.   
IX. RELATED WORK 
The productivity benefits of trust have been identified in 
non-security related contexts: trust between members of an 
organization leads to highly cooperative behaviors, acting as a 
substitute for control [45].  In addition the more connected 
employees feel with an organization, the more committed and 
involved they are [46].  Our findings strongly suggest that 
effective security design can achieve similar benefits in a 
security context, leveraging the identified existing trust 
relationships to provide effective security.  Our findings also 
provided support for the suggestions made by Flechais et al. 
[21] (presented in Section IV): trustworthy behavior can be 
supported through improved employee-centric security design 
and effective communication, improving organizational 
security culture and creating an environment where employees 
collaborate to keep the organization secure. 
X. FURTHER WORK 
We believe our findings present a good starting point to 
understand how trust plays a crucial role in protecting an 
organization.  There are further areas to be explored though.  
Outsourcing, for example, is increasingly popular amongst 
large organizations, in an attempt to save money and also get 
better service from bespoke providers.  To our knowledge, its 
impact on trust development and its effects on security have not 
been studied to date.  In the future we aim to investigate further 
how outsourcing and other changes in the organizational 
environment (e.g. increased amount of employees working 
from home and schemes like Bring Your Own Device) affect 
security-related trust relationships.  Another interesting 
suggestion for further research in the one by Flechais et al. that 
creating simple, reliable means of mutual authentication for 
employees to authenticate to each other can solve the problem 
of social engineering.  Unfortunately we found no evidence to 
support that in our analysis, but it definitely deserves to be part 
of further future research on the subject.  Security self-reporting 
by employees also deserves to be researched further: it is 
interesting to evaluate whether employees will be willing to 
report violations, if an organization provides sufficient 
assurance that it will have no negative impact on them. 
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